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INTRODUCTION
The drastic increase in incarceration in conjunction with the serious decrease in institutionalization of mental health patients has led
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to a significantly higher proportion of incarcerated individuals with
1
serious mental health problems. As a result, the rates of suicide are
2
on the rise in local jails and remain steady in state prisons. Deaths by
suicide as a percentage of total deaths, however, is generally on the
3
rise in both prisons and jails since the death rate has otherwise been
4
in decline. Judge Richard Posner has described the suicide rates in
5
prison as “frighteningly high.” Suicide is the second leading cause of
6
death in jail and the third leading cause of death in prison. Prisons
and jails are severely constrained in the breadth and depth of their
mental health services, thus impeding what would otherwise be ideal
7
methods for reducing prisoner suicide.
As the issues plaguing our systems of incarceration come under
increasing scrutiny, the pervasiveness of mental illness and suicide in
prisons ought to put the treatment of mentally ill and suicidal prisoners toward the forefront of institutional evaluation and reform. The
recent Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Plata addressed the mistreatment of mentally ill prisoners in the context of prison over8
crowding. The issue, however, extends beyond concerns of overcrowding. The “harsh and isolated conditions” and “limited mental
health services” criticized by the Supreme Court are not unique to
9
overcrowded prisons. Courts, including the Supreme Court, recog1

2

3

4
5
6

7

8

9

Ildiko Suto & Genevieve L.Y. Arnaut, Suicide in Prison: A Qualitative Study, 90 THE PRISON
J. 288, 289 (2010) (“[D]einstitutionalizing mental health patients . . . [has] led to a greater proportion of incarcerated individuals with mental health problems, including those at
risk for suicide.”).
MARGARET E. NOONAN & SCOTT GINDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, NCJ 242186, MORALITY IN LOCAL JAILS AND STATE PRISONS, 2000–2001 STATISTICAL TABLES, Tables 2–15 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/mljsp0011.pdf.
Lindsay M. Hayes, Prison Suicide: An Overview and a Guide to Prevention, 75 THE PRISON J.
431, 431 (1995) (“Although the rate of suicide in prisons is far lower than it is in jails, it
remains disproportionately higher than that for the general population.”).
NOONAN & GINDER, supra note 2, at Tables 1, 14.
Belbachir v. Cnty. of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 980–81; See Anasseril E. Daniel, Preventing Suicide in Prison: A Collaborative Responsibility of Administrative, Custodial, and Clinical Staff, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 165, 165
(2006) (“Suicide is the third leading cause of death in U.S. prisons and the second in
jails.”).
OR. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, INMATE SUICIDE PREVENTION STUDY 16–17 (2009), available at
http://www.oregon.gov/DOC/RESRCH/docs/Inmate_Suicide_Prevention_Study_
Report.pdf.
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924–25 (2011) (recognizing that overcrowding and
harsh and isolated conditions have contributed to an inmate suicide rate approaching
one per week).
Id. at 1924; see also Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 417 (7th Cir. 1987) (remanding
case to ascertain “the actual conditions of plaintiff’s confinement and the existence of any
feasible alternatives”).
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nize that the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment extends to protect inmates “from an environment where
10
degeneration is probable and self-improvement unlikely.”
Beyond the moral compunctions, the treatment of suicidal prisoners is of particular concern given the rise in lawsuits against prison
11
12
officials for failing to prevent inmate suicide. In order to preemptively avoid many of these cases, officials have taken measures to
make prisoner suicide nearly impossible. These measures are too often aimed not at providing mental health services, but rather at “pre13
venting the attempt from succeeding.” The purpose of tort law, as
Professor George Keating aptly recognizes, is to incentivize individu14
als to take precautions that are cost-justified, not to prevent injury at
15
any cost. Tort law is intended to strike a balance, but precautions
that exceed justification defy the logic of tort and encroach on our
10
11

12

13

14

15

Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 393 (10th Cir. 1977) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
Suit may be brought against state and local officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or federal
officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). The same legal standards apply to both Section 1983 and Bivens suits and are
therefore evaluated jointly throughout this Comment. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 524
U.S. 61, 81–82 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (highlighting the Court’s recognition of
“sound jurisprudential reasons for parallelism, as different standards for claims against
state and federal actors ‘would be incongruous and confusing’” (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 499 (1978))).
See, e.g., Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 529–30 (7th Cir.
2000) (outlining both an “objectively serious” risk of “substantial harm” and “deliberate
indifference” on behalf of the prison official towards the prison inmate as necessary for
an Eighth Amendment claim); Estate of Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 259 (7th Cir. 1996)
(“[D]efendants may be liable for [an inmate’s] suicide if they were deliberately indifferent . . . .”).
Collignon v. Milwaukee Cnty., 163 F.3d 982, 990–91 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Vega v. Davis,
No. 13-1268, 2014 WL 3585714 (10th Cir. July 22, 2014) (exemplifying cases in which restraints are unsuccessfully used in lieu of mental health services); Easley v. Judd, 1:14-CV100, 2014 WL 897166, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 6, 2014) report and recommendation adopted,
1:14CV100, 2014 WL 1660690 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2014) (“[P]laintiff essentially complains about his long-term placement in isolation as a substitute for treatment for his
mental health issues, which involve depression and suicidal thoughts that have worsened
over the course of the over-two-year period he has been in isolation.”).
See generally United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (establishing a widely adopted algebraic formula for calculating the proper level of precaution);
E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872 (1986) (adopting and
applying a formula to determine that the cost to the public that would result cannot justify holding manufacturer liable). This cost-benefit analysis has been applied to many areas of tort law, including constitutional tort law, as recognized by the Seventh Circuit.
Belbachir v. Cnty. of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975, 981–82 (7th Cir. 2013) (describing “the famous Hand formula” (citing Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173)).
George C. Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 VAND. L. REV.
653, 658, 661 (2003) (arguing that fairness warrants extending precaution beyond costjustification, but not further).
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liberty.16 This dichotomy was recently recognized by the Eastern District of Louisiana when a prisoner alleged an Eighth Amendment violation as a result of being placed on suicide watch. The Court recognized that the measures taken were reasonable and that “if [the
Warden] had ignored plaintiff’s actions and he then committed suicide, she might well have been liable for failing to take preventative
17
measures.”
The risk of suit from inmate suicide and the cost of defending
against such suits, needless to mention the potential cost of an unfavorable judgment, have led officials to take extraordinary measures in
18
physically restraining inmates. Rather than resulting in a burgeoning of cases challenging these severe restraints, though, suits have
continued to charge officials with deliberate indifference despite their
use of extreme restraints, thus encouraging officials to go even fur19
ther in attempting to prevent suicide. Yet just as Professor Keating
20
recognized the liberty limit necessary in general tort law, there likewise needs to be some limit in constitutional tort law, at least insofar as
21
While suicide prevention
the Eighth Amendment is concerned.
measures are intended to prevent self-harm, whether all physically
16
17
18

19

20
21

Id. at 661 (recognizing that there must be a limit to prevent “inflicting harms to our liberty greater than the harms . . . on our security”).
Stewart v. Warner, No. 13-4759-DEK, 2014 WL 3498165, at *4 (E.D. La. July 15, 2014).
See, e.g., Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (7th Cir. 1985) (recounting plaintiff’s
nine-day period restrained in only underwear to a bed by all four limbs leaving abrasions,
bruises, and restricting blood flow while also leaving plaintiff with an unemptied urinal
pitcher provided only at convenience of guards); Bassey v. Wideman, No. DKC-08-3262,
2009 WL 2151340, at *5 (D. Md. July 10, 2009) (approving the use of five-point restraints
on prisoner for four hour intervals and, on some occasions, without clothing).
See, e.g., Beyer ex rel. Estate of Beyer v. Johnson City, No. 2:01-CV-45, 2003 WL 23737298,
at *1, *4, (E.D. Tenn. 2003) (alleging deliberate indifference to suicide committed in “restraint chair” with three body belts, two wrist straps, and two ankle straps).
Keating, supra note 15, at 658, 661.
The Supreme Court has already explicitly established the need for balancing costs and
benefits in similar, related contexts. For example, in determining whether to extend absolute immunity to an official, an analysis that in many cases occurs as a predicate to deciding the issue of Section 1983 liability, the court must launch a “discerning inquiry into
whether the contributions of immunity to effective government . . . outweigh the perhaps
recurring harm to individual citizens.” Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 320 (1973); see also
Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 298 (1988) (recognizing the need to balance potential
costs and benefits under the particular circumstances). This approach has been further
expanded to apply in all inquiries regarding official immunity. Forrester v. White, 484
U.S. 219, 224 (1988). Even when immunity is unavailable, as is often rightly the case, tort
liability in itself likewise requires a balancing act. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
321 (1982) (“[W]hether respondent’s constitutional rights have been violated must be
determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests.”); see also
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560 (1979) (applying balancing tests for First, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendment challenges).
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possible measures should be taken to prevent self-harm at any cost is
22
an issue that has yet to be resolved.
This Comment seeks to identify and discuss an issue in our prison
system partially created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter “Section
1983”) and likewise proposes how Section 1983 may be used to strike
the proper balance between protection and torment of suicidal prisoners. Part I of this Comment examines the liability faced by prison
23
officials for suicides committed by those who are incarcerated and
the effect of such liability on the behavior of prison officials. Part II
explains how the heightened risks associated with suicide liability
identified in Part I lead to suicide prevention measures that are
aimed at avoiding liability rather than protecting and providing mental health treatment for prisoners. Part III briefly explains the
framework for bringing an Eighth Amendment suit under Section
1983 before further analyzing and explaining the dearth of such suits
in regards to the aggressive suicide prevention measures addressed in

22

23

Cf. Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1359–60 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding the use of an
“L” restraint with knees bent and calves perpendicular to back, upper body immobilized
with straightjacket, ankles cuffed, hands cuffed, and anklecuffs and handcuffs strapped
together for nearly three days straight because it only caused “physical discomfort and
emotional pain” without physical injury).
Immunity doctrines often prevent Section 1983 claims from proceeding to the true substance of the constitutional claim itself; however, this Comment focuses on Section 1983
tort liability once immunity claims have been rejected, and the case has proceeded on the
merits. The low standard for extending official immunity—the type of immunity most
likely to arise in the prison context—means prison officials are often shielded from defending against the constitutional tort claim itself. See 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3573.3 (3d ed. 2008)
(“[Q]ualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.’” (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 349 (1986))); see also Wilson v.
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (applying identical qualified immunity analyses to Section 1983 and Bivens). This can create gaps in case law because the Supreme Court no
longer requires courts to first decide the merits of the constitutional claim. In a recent
Supreme Court decision, the Court made discretionary the formerly mandatory two-step
analysis of Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), which required courts to first decide the
merits of the constitutional claim before hearing and deciding a claim of immunity.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (finding the Saucier framework no longer
mandatory, but rather subject to the discretion of lower federal court judges). As a result,
federal courts are now permitted to first resolve an official’s claim of immunity and therefore potentially avoid deciding the merits of a plaintiff’s constitutional claim. Pearson, 555
U.S. at 236; see also Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012) (recognizing that the
Pearson approach “comports with [the Court’s] usual reluctance to decide constitutional
questions unnecessarily”). Despite the plethora of issues raised by the problems of immunity, since the doctrine does not specifically affect the courts’ execution of the standards for finding tort liability upon reaching the merits of the constitutional tort claim, it
has no affect on the lack of balancing at issue here.
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Part II.24 Finally, Part IV discusses implications of the current state of
our case law on mental health treatment services in prisons and possible resolutions.
I. SUICIDE LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983
Inmate suicide is a serious issue in incarceration facilities
throughout the United States. When a prisoner commits suicide
while incarcerated, the estate will often bring a Section 1983 action
against the prison officials or, in the case of jails, perhaps even
25
against the city itself. Federal district courts and circuit courts of
appeal do not resolve Section 1983 suits brought by the estates of deceased prisoners against prison officials uniformly. Looking at a
cross-section of these cases provides a basis for understanding the
challenges and risk of liability faced by prison officials. The risk to
prison officials posed by suicide liability suits has led to a serious esca26
lation in the level of suicide precaution exercised in prisons.
A. Establishing Liability for Prisoner Suicide
To succeed in a survivorship action against prison officials alleging
a failure to protect, the plaintiff’s estate must meet both the objective
and subjective components of the test for deliberate indifference as
27
laid out in Farmer v. Brennan. The objective component requires the

24

25

26

27

Actions against federal, state, and local officials are analyzed uniformly throughout this
Comment because the same substantive legal standard applies to each action. While a
more rigorous standard applies to a Bivens action in certain new contexts, which likely reduces the number and success of suits against federal officials under federal law, because
this only applies to limit suits permitted to go forward and not the standard for liability
applied, it will have no effect in the ultimate finding of liability relevant here. See Carlson
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980) (delineating situations where a Bivens action may be
defeated); Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2012) (refusing to apply a Bivens remedy for alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
Suits brought against a municipality are more challenging to prove, and therefore less
frequent, as Section 1983 suits brought against municipalities require showing that the
municipality has an official policy or custom that caused the deprivation of rights. Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). Even in particularly egregious cases where the liability of the municipality is clear, the prohibition on punitive
damages for municipal liability further limits the ultimate success of municipal liability
claims. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (“[W]e hold that a
municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”).
In addition to the well-known risk of defending against a lawsuit, there is also the risk of
adverse publicity. See Hayes, supra note 3, at 431–32 (1995) (documenting resulting publicity following prison suicides).
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (relying on precedent to establish requirements for proof of
objective seriousness and subjective culpability).
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plaintiff to prove that the alleged deprivation is objectively “sufficient28
ly serious.” The subjective component enforces the principle established in Wilson v. Seiter that “only the unnecessary and wanton inflic29
tion of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.” The defendantprison official must have a requisite mental state beyond mere negligence – the defendant must be “deliberately indifferent” to the
30
The Court reads the Eighth
health or safety of the inmate.
Amendment as requiring this subjective component because the
Amendment does not prohibit “cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it
31
outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’”
1. The Objective Prong
In suits alleging a failure to protect an inmate from suicide, the
objective component involves a straightforward inquiry as to whether
32
there was a sufficiently serious risk of suicide. The objective component hinges on whether there is a medical need so obvious that a
33
layperson would recognize the need for medical attention. If the
prisoner succeeds in committing suicide, however, this prong is nec34
essarily met. In many circuits, deliberate indifference to an inmate’s
psychological needs violates the inmate’s constitutional rights just as
35
much as disregard to physical needs. For such an allegation to rise
to the level of “sufficiently serious” there must be “neglect of ‘serious’
medical needs,” because there is no expectation in society that pris36
oners will have unqualified health care access. It is recognized that
37
suicidal tendencies constitute a serious medical need. In addition to
demonstrating neglect of the inmate’s serious medical needs, subjec28
29
30
31
32
33
34

35
36
37

Id. (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836–37 (“[T]he official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety.”).
Id. at 837.
See Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[D]eliberate indifference has become the barometer by which suicide cases . . . are tested.”).
Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 639
F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980)).
See, e.g., Gaston v. Ploeger, 297 F. App’x 738, 742 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that the objective component is “[o]bviously” satisfied by suicide); Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757, 760
(7th Cir. 2006) (reaffirming prior cases establishing that “the objective element is met by
virtue of the suicide itself”).
Blackmon, 734 F.3d at 1245 (citing Ramos, 639 F.2d at 574–75).
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04
(1976)).
Schultz v. Sillman, 148 F. App’x 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[S]uicidal tendencies constitute a serious medical need.”).
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tively there must be deliberate indifference on the part of the defendant.
2. The Subjective Prong
The subjective prong of the Farmer test is far more difficult to
prove and is often fatal to the claim. The prison official must actually
know of the inhumane nature of the plaintiff’s confinement, yet deny
38
or delay medical care. Because deliberate indifference is not established by mere negligence, the subjective prong imposes a more
stringent standard than most tort law. Rather, the Supreme Court
has established a standard akin to criminal recklessness where a defendant is liable for consciously disregarding a substantial risk of seri39
ous harm. The standard is more stringent than mere negligence,
40
but does not go so far as to require an actual intent to harm. In
Mitchell, the defendant-officer explicitly ordered Mr. Mitchell
stripped naked in a concrete cell without heat, bedding, glasses, exercise, writing utensils, adequate ventilation, hot water, and limited
41
toilet paper. The alleged deprivations caused by the officer’s orders
42
were sufficient for a reasonable jury to find deliberate indifference.
In many cases, however, there is far more limited information availa43
ble to infer deliberate indifference. But the court will often investigate whether the inmate showed a strong likelihood that he would attempt suicide to an extent that the officer must have strongly
44
suspected the risk. As a result, an officer may be liable even without
45
having explicit knowledge of the risk of suicide.
38
39
40

41
42
43

44

Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–06).
Mata, 427 F.3d at 752.
Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1442 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Deliberate indifference does
not require a finding of express intent to harm.” (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,
319 (1986))).
Mitchell, 80 F.3d at 1442.
Id.
Cf. Rellergert v. Cape Girardeau Cnty., 924 F.2d 794, 796 (8th Cir. 1991) (requiring evidentiary proof of deliberate indifference outside suicide itself). The difficulties of proof
both for prisoners and prison officials may subside in the near future as video recording
technology becomes increasingly accessible and affordable. See, e.g., Jacoby v. Mack, No.
12-0366-CG-C, 2014 WL 2435655, at *15 (S.D. Ala. May 30, 2014) (“Subsequent to . . .
Plaintiff’s alleged May 23, 2012 assault, another guard and extra cameras were placed in
the unit.”); O’Connor v. Kelley, No. 3:10CV360/LAC/EMT, 2014 WL 1133522, at *2
(N.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2014) (noting that a prison official “arrived at the location and began
operating a portable video/audio recording camera”); Bassey v. Wideman, No. DKC-083262, 2009 WL 2151340, at *2 (D. Md. July 10, 2009) (“[R]estraint cells are monitored by
cameras[.]”).
Schultz v. Sillman, 148 F. App’x 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d
630, 641 (7th Cir. 1996) (“It is enough for Haley to show that the defendants actually
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B. Additional Risks in Suits Alleging Liability for Prisoner Suicide
There are three serious concerns that make suicide liability suits
particularly risky for prison officials. These risks arise as a result of
fewer concerns at trial in suicide liability cases. The first concern is
the cost of discovery, and of potentially defending, that arises based
on the difficulty of proving a subjective state of mind without extensive inquiry. Since these claims often require probing factual investigation, summary judgment is less likely to occur early in the litigation, and perhaps may not occur at all. Secondly, prison officials are
often accorded high levels of deference in prison administration
challenges, but since suicides often occur outside the usual context of
maintaining order in the prison, there is less deference and therefore
a higher chance of liability. While deference usually imposes another
obstacle in Eighth Amendment claims, that obstacle is removed, or at
least reduced, in the context of prisoner suicide. Finally, the Prison
Litigation Reform Act was specifically enacted to reduce the number
of suits brought by prisoners against officials. While the Act specifically creates heightened requirements for suit, the PLRA is inapplicable when the prisoner has committed suicide and is thus no longer
incarcerated. These three concerns in combination make suicide liability cases more likely to proceed further into litigation and therefore incentivize prison officials to go above and beyond in avoiding
such claims.
1. Cost of Defending Beyond Summary Judgment
Even when prison officials perfectly execute all reasonable prevention measures, prisoners determined to commit suicide may still suc46
Oftentimes, such suicides then become the basis of suits
ceed.
against prison officials. The cost of defending against such suits, even
when they do not proceed past the summary judgment stage, deters
prison officials who would otherwise refrain from taking suicide pre47
cautions that crossed over the bounds of reasonableness. Since the

45
46

47

knew of a substantial risk that Wilborn would seriously harm him.” (emphasis omitted));
Price v. Sasser, 65 F.3d 342, 345–46 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he inmate must show that he is
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.”).
See Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005) (recognizing objective indications of suicide, although generally difficult to predict).
See, e.g., Beyer ex rel. Estate of Beyer v. Johnson City, No. 2:01-CV-45, 2003 WL 23737298,
at *4, (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 24, 2003) (alleging deliberate indifference to suicide committed
in “restraint chair” with three body belts, two wrist straps, and two ankle straps).
Before the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the costs of discovery, particularly in civil rights
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subjective prong is inordinately fact-specific due to the inherent difficulty in ascertaining an official’s state of mind, deliberate indiffer48
ence claims necessarily require particularly invasive discovery. Furthermore, since fee shifting is not symmetrical under 42 U.S.C. §
49
1988(b), defendants are unlikely to recoup the cost of the suit even
50
if it fails.

48

49

50

suits, were widely examined and discussed. See, e.g., Eric Harbrook Cottrell, Civil Rights
Plaintiffs, Clogged Courts, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Supreme Court Takes A
Look at Heightened Pleading Standards in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1085, 1100–01 (1994) (“A § 1983 plaintiff
sometimes must engage in a great deal of costly and disruptive discovery to substantiate a
claim.”); Elaine M. Korb & Richard A. Bales, A Permanent Stop Sign: Why Courts Should
Yield to the Temptation to Impose Heightened Pleading Standards in § 1983 Cases, 41 BRANDEIS
L.J. 267, 269, 284 (2002) (“Consistent with its exercise of judicial restraint, the Crawford-El
Court declined the invitation to revise established rules and employ a blunt instrument
that inflicts a high cost on plaintiffs with bona fide constitutional claims.”). Since the advent of the heightened pleading standard and its application to civil rights claims in 2009,
this discussion has largely abated, but the issue remains. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. See, e.g.,
Stephen R. Brown, Reconstructing Pleading: Twombly, Iqbal, and the Limited Role of the Plausibility Inquiry, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1265, 1266 (2010) (“In 2009, the Supreme Court’s Ashcroft v. Iqbal opinion confirmed that Twombly articulated a general standard of pleading
that applied outside of the antitrust context.”); Morgan Smith, On Notice: The Supreme
Court’s Recent Decisions Regarding Heightened Pleading Requirements Leave Much to Be Desired,
10 APPALACHIAN J.L. 47, 56 n.98 (2010) (“Even though the Supreme Court originally endorsed notice pleading in Conley v. Gibson, courts have since embraced heightened pleadings in many contexts.”).
See Rellergert v. Cape Girardeau Cnty., 924 F.2d 794, 795–98 (8th Cir. 1991) (recognizing
that “the concept behind the controlling law is simple, [but] application . . . necessarily
depends on the facts of a given case”); see also Freedman v. City of Allentown, 853 F.2d
1111, 1114–15 (3d Cir. 1988) (permitting discovery that allows plaintiff the opportunity
to prove case).
While unlikely, it is not impossible for defendants to recover costs, since Rule 11 may also
provide for fees in cases involving sanctionable conduct. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. A defendant
may also receive post-offer costs, but not fees, through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68
(hereinafter “Rule 68”). FED. R. CIV. P. 68; see Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329, 333
(1st Cir. 1986) (“[P]laintiff who refuses an offer of judgment, and later fails to obtain a
more favorable judgment, must pay the defendant’s post-offer costs.”); see also Pouillon v.
Little, 326 F.3d 713, 718–19 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 68 . . . requires that an offer made
pursuant to the rule be compared to the judgment ‘finally obtained.’”); Tunison v. Cont’l
Airlines Corp., 162 F.3d 1187, 1193–94 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]nterpreting Rule 68 to require payment of a defendant’s costs where the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is less
favorable than an earlier offer . . . is entirely consistent with Rule 68’s purpose . . . .”);
O’Brien v. City of Greers Ferry, 873 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1989) (“We hold that a
plaintiff who refuses an offer of judgment under Rule 68 and later fails to receive a more
favorable judgment must pay the defendant’s post-offer costs.”); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 691 F.2d 438, 442 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[W]here a Rule
68 offer is made and the judgment finally obtained by the plaintiff is not more favorable
than the offer, he must pay the costs incurred after the asking of the offer.”).
42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West 2000).
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Finally, the unpredictable nature of judge and jury determinations
51
as to deliberate indifference adds further cost to litigation by reducing clarity in deciding when to settle. Unpredictability in assessing
the outcome of cases may lead officials to unnecessarily decide to set52
tle or litigate. Unpredictability in assessing outcomes in the form of
monetary verdicts may also hinder the ability of officials to effectively
use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 (hereinafter “Rule 68”) when
53
making settlement offers, since Rule 68 only allows defendants to
escape paying a prevailing plaintiffs’ attorneys fees and costs when
the offer made was higher than the judgment ultimately collected by
54
the plaintiff.
2. Deference to Prison Officials
The second issue arises from the lower level of deference afforded
in a majority of suicide cases. Unlike in cases in which officers must
use force to restore order in emergency situations and thus act out of
urgent necessity, which earns the officers a great deal of deference
55
from the courts, suicide liability cases are often not made in the con56
text of split-second decisions that require extensive discretion. Prison officials outside the context of emergency situations do not receive the reduced standard of “good faith effort,” and therefore

51

52

53

54
55

56

See Christy P. Johnson, Mental Health Care Policies in Jail Systems: Suicide and the Eighth
Amendment, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 1243–47 (2002) (comparing Estate of Cills v. Kaftan, 105 F. Supp. 2d 391 (D.N.J. 2000), with Estate of Novack v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d
525 (7th Cir. 2000), as demonstrative of this inconsistency).
See generally Danielle M. Shelton, Rewriting Rule 68: Realizing the Benefits of the Federal Settlement Rule by Injecting Certainty into Offers of Judgment, 91 MINN. L. REV. 865, 916 (2007)
(“[I]nstead of litigants ‘evaluat[ing] the risk and costs of litigation’ as intended by the
rule, litigants end up evaluating the risks and costs of Rule 68.”); Lesley S. Bonney et. al,
Rule 68: Awakening A Sleeping Giant, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 379, 379 (1997) (“Litigants
and counsel find it extraordinarily difficult to make informed decisions on the merits of
making or accepting an offer of judgment under Rule 68.”).
See Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Thomas A. Eaton, Of Offers Not (Frequently) Made and (Rarely) Accepted: The Mystery of Federal Rule 68, 57 MERCER L. REV. 723, 733–34 (2006) (detailing
multiple reasons for the underutilization of Rule 68).
FED R. CIV. P. 68; see, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985) (finding petitioners
not obligated to pay costs, including attorney fees, incurred after settlement offer).
See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986) (distinguishing cases where prison
security measures are undertaken to resolve a disturbance (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481
F.2d 1028, 1033 (1973))).
See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321–22 (finding that prison security, which is ordinarily left to the
discretion of prison officials, is afforded even more deference in the face of actual conflict or unrest) citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 n.14 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish
441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979))).
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liability is more likely to result in cases involving the suicide of an in57
mate.
58
This is not to suggest, however, that deference is lacking. In fact,
the Supreme Court jurisprudence is highly deferential to prison ad59
ministrators. It remains unclear whether this level of deference is
appropriate when prisoners challenge conditions of confinement
60
under the Eighth Amendment. As a result, the level of deference
varies with the jurisdiction and the particular court’s standard of def61
erence. An unclear standard of deference adds to the uncertainty of
Eighth Amendment cases and likely leads prison officials to err on
the side of caution in terms of reducing liability, thus providing fur62
ther reason for officials to employ extensive suicide precautions.
3. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996
63
Finally, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which is aimed at re64
ducing claims asserted by prisoners, does not apply to causes of ac-

57
58
59

60

61
62

63
64

See Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033 (setting a standard for correctional officers applying force in
good faith, rather than maliciously and sadistically to cause harm).
See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404–05 (1974) (creating a laundry list of
reasons for exceptional deference to prison authorities).
Bell, 441 U.S. at 547–48 (“Prison administrators therefore should be accorded wideranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their
judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”).
See Mikel-Meredith Weidman, The Culture of Judicial Deference and the Problem of Supermax
Prisons, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1505, 1522–23 (2004) (“[S]ome federal courts play an active
role in extending the Court’s deferential policies.”). The inconsistency in deference may
be seen by comparing Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1991)
(en banc), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992) and Roland v. Johnson, 856 F.2d 764, 769
(6th Cir. 1988) with Jones’El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1124–25 (W.D. Wis. 2001),
which recognizes that defendants are afforded deference, but finds for prisoners nonetheless.
See Weidman, supra note 60, at 1521–23 (delineating the circuit split in applying Turner
deference).
See Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and Wrongs in Our Own Backyard: Incorporating International Human Rights Protections Under Domestic Civil Rights Law—A Case Study of Women in
United States Prisons, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 71, 101 (2000) (“Turner’s broad language left
uncertainty as to whether the Court intended the rational basis standard to apply to
Eighth Amendment claims of cruel and unusual punishment.”).
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (West 2013) (outlining the conditions under which prisoners
may bring suit and the limitations on such suits).
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93–94 (2006) (“The PLRA attempts to eliminate unwarranted federal-court interference with the administration of prisons . . . . The PLRA also
was intended to ‘reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.’” (quoting
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002))).
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tion brought by a deceased prisoner’s estate.65 Ordinarily, under the
PLRA, prisoners must exhaust all administrative remedies that are
66
available regardless of whether they provide the relief demanded.
An estate bringing suit does not encounter this barrier since the
PLRA only applies to currently incarcerated prisoners, nor must it
67
comply with the filing fee and physical injury requirements. Complaints against prison officials alleging liability for suicide are therefore much more likely than ordinary Eighth Amendment cases to re68
quire extensive litigation.
The probing discovery, reduced likelihood of summary judgment,
difficulties in assessing settlement, an unclear standard of deference,
and the lack of PLRA protection likely influence prison officials to
take such extensive measures in an attempt to prevent prisoner suicide. Even though these cases are not necessarily more likely to succeed, the risk inherent in proceeding through discovery and litigation is enough to lead prison officials to take extraordinary measures.
Part II will evaluate these measures, their efficacy in preventing suicide, and their effects on the mental state of suicidal prisoners. Then
Part III will discuss how the Eighth Amendment, through Section
1983 suits, should deter prison officials from such precautions that
reach too far.

65

66

67

68

The scope of the PLRA applies only to prisoners and the Act defines “prisoner” in such a
manner as to not extend to the estate of deceased prisoners. John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act, THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY PRISONER’S RIGHTS PROJECT PRO BONO
TRAINING, Feb. 27, 2006, at 1-5, available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/
Boston_PLRA_Treatise.pdf (analyzing case law to establish the definition of “prisoner”
under the PLRA, which generally is limited to only currently confined persons); 18
U.S.C.A. § 3626(g)(3) (West 1997) (defining “prisoner” as “any person subject to incarceration, detention, or admission to any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced
for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law”).
See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 733 (2001) (holding that prisoners must exhaust the
prison administrative process if it “could provide some sort of relief on the complaint
stated”).
28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1915(b)(1), (g) (West 1996) (requiring filling fees to be paid in full with a
limited exception and imposing a three strikes limit to reduced filing fees); 42 U.S.C.A. §
1997e(e) (West 2013) (eliminating suits for mental and emotional injury unless accompanied by physical injury).
The PLRA provides barriers to nearly all civil suits brought by prisoners against prison
officials in accordance with the intent of Congress to discourage and reduce prison litigation; removing such a limitation therefore significantly opens opportunity for litigation.
See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (applying the PLRA to “all inmate suits
about prison life”).
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II. SUICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES
Many national, state, and local entities are taking measures to
69
combat the high suicide rate plaguing our jails and prisons. Officials have not been left alone in the endeavor, and various task forces
and researchers have taken up the issue of predicting and preventing
70
suicide. There is no doubt that our treatment of mentally ill prisoners has improved over the course of time; however, as the mentally ill
prison population continues to increase, the methods for handling
71
suicidal prisoners becomes of increasing import.
Many of the most important suicide prevention standards have
72
been developed and implemented in an effort to avoid liability.
Prisons generally respond to suicidal prisoners by imposing restrictions that make it nearly impossible for the prisoner to commit
73
suicide. Such measures range from placing the inmate in administrative segregation with heightened supervision to prisoners being
stripped naked and restrained to a chair. Prison officials, who tend
69

70

71

72

73

See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF CORRECTIONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EFFECTIVE PRISON MENTAL
HEALTH SERVICES: GUIDELINES TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE TREATMENT 1–8 (2004 ed.),
available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/018604.pdf (examining
“in detail correctional health care programs and suggest[ing] guidelines that contain
mechanisms for program implementation”); OR. DEP’T. OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 7, at
16–17 (summarizing statistics on the occurrence of inmate suicides in prisons); Judith F.
Cox & Pamela C. Morschauser, A Solution to the Problem of Jail Suicide, 18 CRISIS 178, 178–
184 (1997) . The single largest contributor to the study and treatment of suicidal prisoners for the last three decades has been Lindsay Hayes at the National Center for Institutions and Alternatives. See Ronald L. Bonner, Correctional Suicide Prevention in the Year 2000
and Beyond, 30 SUICIDE AND LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR 370, 370–71 (2000) (providing
an overview of Hayes’ contributions).
Nobert Konrad et. al, Preventing Suicide in Prisons, Part I: Recommendations from the International Association for Suicide Prevention Task Force on Suicide in Prisons, 28 CRISIS 113–121
(2007).
Jacques Baillargeon et. al, Psychiatric Disorders and Suicide in the Nation’s Largest State Prison
System, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 188, 188 (2009) (recognizing suicide as one of
leading causes of death due to half of the prison population being mentally ill and then
subjected to “psychological stressors” in the correctional setting).
See Bonner, supra note 69, at 371 (2000) (“Based on . . . increasing litigation involving jail
and prison suicides, several major suicide prevention standards have been developed.”);
Anasseril E. Daniel, Preventing Suicide in Prison: A Collaborative Responsibility of Administrative, Custodial, and Clinical Staff, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 165, 173 (2006), available at
http://www.jaapl.org/content/34/2/165.full.pdf+html (“The program described
is . . . to avoid any malpractice or deliberate-indifference claims”).
Precautions that strive for impossibility tend to be employed as default measures to abate
suicide risk, but are unlikely to be effective or productive. See Jay S. Albanese, Preventing
Inmate Suicides, 47 FED. PROBATION 65, 68 (1983) (advancing the claim that locking an
inmate in a room with all dangerous instruments removed is not supported by research);
Hayes, supra note 3, at 431, 434 (citing a thirteen-year period where 79% of suicides in
Kentucky prisons occurred in special housing units).
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to select suicide prevention methods most convenient to the staff rather than require extensive observation and treatment, will often
74
The literature,
physically isolate or even restrain the individual.
however, recognizes that inmates should only be stripped naked and
75
physically restrained as an absolute last resort. Furthermore, isolation and deprivation of human contact are also disfavored; housing
assignments are more effective in protecting inmates when based on
76
interaction and observation of the inmate. The scientifically supported policies to ensure proper care and prevention include “(1) suicide assessment, observation, and intervention; (2) psychotropic
medication use; (3) involuntary/forced medication and involuntary
medical treatment; and (4) inpatient hospitalization of the mentally
77
Despite research and common-sense counseling against exill.”
78
treme isolation, sensory deprivation, and the extensive use of restraints, most suicide precautions employed in jail and prison settings
79
utilize such methods.
80
Perhaps one of the most commonly used (or abused) measures is
administrative segregation, wherein the inmate is removed from the

74

75
76

77
78

79

80

LINDSAY M. HAYES, NAT’L CTR. ON INSTITUTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES, SUICIDE PREVENTION
IN CUSTODY: GUIDE TO DEVELOPING AND REVISING SUICIDE PREVENTION PROTOCOLS
WITHIN JAILS AND PRISONS (2011), available at http://www.ncianet.org/services/suicideprevention-in-custody/publications/guide-to-developing-and-revising-suicide-preventionprotocols-within-jails-and-prisons.
Id.
See Id. at n.11 (2011) (explaining that precautions that appear punitive create reluctance
in inmates who are suicidal to seek mental health services or admit to suicidal thoughts).
This is further bolstered by evidence demonstrating that sixty percent of inmates may
“communicate their intent to kill themselves either verbally or nonverbally,” thus creating
a very real reason not to dissuade such communication. Daniel, supra note 72, at 171.
Daniel, supra note 72, at 169.
See generally Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 115, 116 (2008) (“[C]onditions of prolonged solitary have long been known to
cause serious mental harm.”).
A cross section of recent cases from multiple jurisdictions demonstrate the prevalence of
restraints and isolation in prisons and jails across the country. See, e.g., Vega v. Davis, No.
13-1268, 2014 WL 3585714 (10th Cir. July 22, 2014) (discussing the use of restraints);
Belbachir v. Cnty. of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussing the use of
isolation); McCreary v. Governor of Virginia, No. 3:12CV484-HEH, 2014 WL 4162202, at
n.12 (E.D. Va. Aug. 19, 2014) (asserting the authority for the use of restraints); Easley v.
Judd, 1:14-CV-100, 2014 WL 897166 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 6, 2014) report and recommendation
adopted, 1:14CV100, 2014 WL 1660690 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2014) (discussing the use of
isolation); Gay v. Chandra, 652 F. Supp. 2d 959, 967 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (discussing the use of
restraints); Bassey v. Wideman, No. DKC-08-3262, 2009 WL 2151340 (D. Md. July 10,
2009) (discussing the use of restraints).
See Bonner, supra note 69, at 374 (“Perhaps no factor has been more tragically associated
with jail and prison suicides than the consistent finding of isolated/segregated housing of
the jail or prison environment.” (citing Ronald L. Bonner, Isolation, Seclusion, and Psycho-

274

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:1

general population and placed in an isolated cell. A prisoner in
North Carolina brought suit to challenge the conditions of his confinement; he was kept in a small, concrete cell, was provided extremely minimal contact with others, and could not participate in activities
81
or go outdoors for several years. During that time, and despite
those restrictions, Mr. Williams was still occasionally placed in re82
straints while in a concrete cell alone for four-hour periods. The
Fourth Circuit, however, upheld dismissal of the claim arguing that to
the extent the isolation and behavioral restrictions aggravated plaintiff’s mental illness, it was merely “an unfortunate but inevitable result
83
of his incarceration.” The court concluded that, based on the responsibility of prison officials to limit self-harm, there was not a suffi84
cient deprivation.
There are certainly cases in which courts, even within the same jurisdiction, reach the opposite result. A prisoner in Virginia, Mr. Milton McCray, was confined in a “mental observation” cell where he was
stripped naked and confined to a room without a blanket, a mattress,
85
a sink, running water, or hygienic tools. Despite an initial dismissal
86
by the district court, the circuit court found that the conditions ab87
solutely presented an issue triable by a jury. The Fourth Circuit held
that, even if such conditions were to be permissible, the failure of the
official “to devise and employ means to protect McCray from injury to
himself other than continued isolation with deprivation of clothing
88
and elements of personal hygiene,” was not permissible. While this
is the intuitive result, when contrasted with the Fourth Circuit deci89
sion in Williams, such results are anything but predictable.
Although courts have routinely upheld the use of segregation and
90
isolation, the field of psychology recognizes that “such archaic prac-

81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

social Vulnerability as Risk Factors for Suicide Behind Bars, in ASSESSMENT AND PREDICTION OF
SUICIDE, 398–419 (Ronald W. Maris et. al eds., 1992))).
Williams v. Branker, 462 F. App’x 348, 350–51 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Id. at 354.
Id.
McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 1975) (describing conditions of confinement in the mental observation cell).
Id. at 360 (“[The district court] found that no constitutional violations had occurred in
the incidents alleged.”).
Id. at 369 (“[We] cannot conceive that decent society would tolerate it even for a suspected mental patient who had been convicted of a crime.”).
Id.
Williams v. Branker, 462 F. App’x 348, 354 (4th Cir. 2012).
While a majority of courts do not consider indefinite administrative segregation to violate
the Eighth Amendment, there have been notable exceptions where inmates were left in
segregation without any mental health care. Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237, 1245
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tices” must be reevaluated in order for our society make serious pro91
gress in preventing prisoner suicide. Alternatives exist. Cells can be
designed to significantly reduce the risk of hanging by using air vents
with holes too small to thread a sheet through, break-away shower
92
heads, and concrete slab-secured mattresses. Such designs are par93
ticularly effective when paired with human supervision.
Notably missing from the literature on effective and productive
94
suicide prevention measures is the use of restraints. Juries have held
prison officials liable even when they took all reasonable precau95
tions, thus encouraging officials to take extreme measures such as
96
full restraints. But of graver concern is the result of using restraints.
Mr. Wells, a prisoner in an Illinois correctional center thought to
be suicidal, exemplifies the concerns inherent in the restraint prac97
tices. Mr. Wells was placed in a four-point shackle wherein each
98
limb was shackled to one corner of the bed. Mr. Wells remained
99
shackled to the bed for nine days. The shackles were not gentle;
there were abrasion and bruises resulting from restricted blood

91
92
93
94

95

96

97
98
99

(10th Cir. 2013) (recognizing concerns stemming from use of restraints without providing mental health treatment); see e.g., Casey v. Lewis, 834 F. Supp. 1477, 1553 (D. Ariz.
1993) (restricting the use of segregation as an alternative to mental health care).
Bonner, supra note 69, at 370–71 (arguing that serious mental health care and suicide
prevention advancements require alternatives to archaic isolation practices).
See Daniel, supra note 72, at 170 (explaining methods of planning cell design to reduce
suicide risk).
Id. at 170–71 (concluding that cell design methods are imperfect, but when paired with
human supervision provide a deterrent to suicide).
See Hayes, supra note 3, at 431, 446 (detailing effective suicide prevention policies as those
with six critical components: “staff training, intake screening/assessment, housing, levels
of supervision, intervention, and administrative review”).
See e.g., Rellergert v. Cape Girardeau Cnty., 924 F.2d 794, 796–97 (8th Cir. 1991) (overturning jury verdict for prisoner whose estate argued he should have been fully restrained
because “the question is not whether the jailers did all they could have, but whether they
did all the Constitution requires”).
See Vega v. Davis, No. 13-1268, 2014 WL 3585714 (10th Cir. July 22, 2014) (recognizing
the cruelty of placing an emaciated, largely incoherent prisoner in a cell utterly alone
without mental health care and chained hand and foot); Bassey v. Wideman, No. DKC-083262, 2009 WL 2151340, at *5 (D. Md. July 10, 2009) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendants where prisoner, on multiple occasions, was stripped of clothing, placed
in a “suicide smock,” and restrained using a five point system at his wrists, ankles, and torso, because he was monitored in fifteen minute intervals); Ferola v. Moran, 622 F. Supp.
814, 820 (D.R.I. 1985) (granting prisoner relief after being shackled in a “spread eagle”
position for twenty hours with no toilet access for fourteen of those hours, thus forcing
him to lay in his urine and causing permanent nerve damage to his arm).
Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1260–61 (detailing the conditions under which plaintiff was kept).
Id. at 1260 (“After four days, plaintiff was interviewed briefly by a psychiatrist and, although he denied ever expressing suicidal intentions, remained tied down for another five
days.”).
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flow.100 Mr. Wells had limited access to water, limited access to a urinal pitcher that required help of the guards and was rarely emptied,
was itchy, ill, covered in a rash, and was not permitted to shower for
101
the entire nine day period. The district court dismissed Mr. Wells’
102
claims on a motion for summary judgment, deciding that there was
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the officials were
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law without ever reaching a ju103
ry. The disturbing aspects of Mr. Wells’ confinement demonstrates
how the use of restraints may disturb common notions of decency
and the Seventh Circuit recognized the potentially “unconscionable
104
conditions of restraints” before reversing and remanding to the
105
lower court.
While Mr. Wells being shackled for nine days is an extraordinary
case, the district court was still unwilling to protect Mr. Wells’
106
This unreasonable level of deference further exemplifies
rights.
the barriers faced by suits challenging allegedly unconstitutional use
of restraints. And, as in isolation cases, the likelihood of success is
equally uncertain. In a 1974 opinion that continues to stand as good
law today, the Fifth Circuit chastised Alabama prisons for, along with
a host of serious defects in their mental health programs, not putting
107
Such conflicting
inmates in lockup cells equipped with restraints.
views espoused by courts add to a lack of clarity already pervasive in
this area of law.
III. SUICIDE PREVENTION MEASURES AND SECTION 1983
There are three methods by which a prisoner may challenge actions taken by prison officials under the Eighth Amendment, but
each challenge must meet the aforementioned objective and subjec-

100
101
102
103

104
105
106
107

Id. at 1261 (noting that “restraints were carelessly applied, causing abrasions and bruises
and restricting blood flow to his limbs”).
Id.
Id. at 1260.
FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.”).
Wells, 777 F.2d at 1264 (citing McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 369 (4th Cir. 1975)).
Wells, 777 F.2d at 1264–65 (“In light of the eighth amendment precedents . . . conditions
of his restraint are sufficient to warrant further examination.”).
Id. at 1265.
Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1324 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 948 (1975)
(criticizing the practice of housing mentally unwell prisoners with general population
and, if eventually removed, put in “lockup cells not equipped with restraints”).
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tive prongs of the Farmer test to succeed.108 The three challenges are
those contesting: conditions of confinement, excessive use of force,
and deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the pris109
oner.
Even though both prongs of the Farmer test must be met in each
case, the applicable standards vary. To challenge the conditions of
confinement, the prisoner must show that there are “extreme deprivations” since mere discomfort is considered part of the punishment
110
itself. Extreme deprivations are only those so grave as to deny “the
111
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” and are proven by
showing that an official was “deliberately indifferent to a risk of seri112
ous harm to the plaintiff inmate.” An excessive-force claim requires
the defendant to prove that the force was applied “maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,” rather than applied
113
in a good faith effort to diffuse an emergency.
Lastly, in addition to an objectively serious medical need, cases alleging inadequate medical attention require the prison to prove that
the official’s state of mind must reach the level of “deliberate indif114
ference.” The psychological needs of suicidal inmates constitute a
115
serious medical need for which liability may attach. Such liability,
however, is limited to circumstances in which prison officials know of
the need for more mental health care, but are nonetheless deliberately
116
Ultimately, since
indifferent to the medical needs of the prisoners.
conditions-of-confinement and deprivation of medical care challeng117
es are the claims available to a suicidal inmate, the success of such
suits will necessarily depend on establishing deliberate indifference.
108
109
110

111
112
113
114

115
116
117

See supra Part I.A.
Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2010).
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992) (“[E]xtreme deprivations are required to
make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,
347 (1981))).
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1312 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994)).
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,
1033 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)).
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976) (“[D]eliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 172–73 (1976))).
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–06 (“[D]eliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.”).
See Townsend v. City of Morehead, 208 F.3d 215 (6th Cir. 2000) (establishing knowledge
as essential to a finding of deliberate indifference).
Excessive force is excluded from the analysis since the suicide prevention methods employed are highly unlikely to be used “maliciously and sadistically” as is required by such a
standard. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (noting that the intent of the
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Although there is limited research evaluating the effect of severe
suicide prevention measures, many observers continue to research
118
and argue that we are not doing enough to combat inmate suicide.
The American Correctional Association first began promulgating accreditation standards that recommend policies and procedures for
119
The National Commission
addressing suicidal detainees in 1981.
on Correctional Health Care has supplemented these recommendations with practical guidelines intended to improve suicide preven120
tion programs and reduce the “risk of adverse legal judgments.”
Nonetheless, even as recently as 2005, the majority of facilities had yet
to adopt and enact successful suicide prevention programs, and researchers argued that it would take many more years of lawsuits for
121
proper guidelines to be finally implemented.
I do not disagree. It seems that while many facilities have not
gone far enough to properly treat suicidal prisoners, many others have
gone too far to improperly isolate, restrain, and neglect suicidal prisoners. Hence, Part IV argues for a balance. We do need tort law to
impose suicide liability to properly incentivize prison officials to aid
the mentally ill and take precautions to prevent suicide. But we also
need tort law to impose liability for indefinitely segregating and extensively restraining prisoners for a mental condition often outside
their control. This is not outside the realm of possibility. Tort law is
designed to achieve socially optimal behavior by imposing civil liabil122
ity for unreasonable conduct. Section 1983 can lead officials to that
balance.
Section 1983 suits seeking to enjoin the use of allegedly unconstitutional isolation, and restraint procedures are more difficult to bring
than suits brought by an estate after an inmate has committed suicide. There are two readily identifiable reasons for this difference.

118

119
120
121
122

Eighth Amendment is to prohibit barbarous punishment and torture); see, e.g., Rice ex rel.
Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2012) (dismissing an excessive force
claim brought after an inmate was restrained to a chair for an eighteen-hour period).
See e.g., Schnavia Smith Hatcher, Deliberate Indifference in Jail Suicide Litigation: A Fatal Judicial Loophole, 24 SOC. WORK IN PUB. HEALTH 401, 406–08 (2009) (claiming that ambiguous
standards and procedures “result[] in an array of minimally compliant suicide prevention
standards overall”).
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id. at 408 (“Court proceedings had not provided any impetus to the jails to develop or
augment their policies . . . [I]t would take many more years of ‘legalese.’”).
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (establishing that punishments incompatible with the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”
are violative of the Eighth Amendment).
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First, there will likely be more difficult issues with proof. Part
I.B.1 addressed the risks posed to officials by suicide liability suits and
cited the difficulties in proving deliberate indifference as a barrier to
summary judgment, which heightens the risk of being required to
provide full discovery and fully litigate the suit. The risk is heightened compared to Section 1983 actions brought under other constitutional provisions, which do not require proof of subjective intent.
The degree of proof required for suicide liability suits compared to
that required for actions brought by currently incarcerated persons
challenging conditions of confinement or deprivation of medical
care, is significantly reduced. As discussed in Part I.A.1, in suicide liability cases the plaintiff need not prove that an objectively serious
harm occurred since the suicide itself is evidence of such harm. Conversely, a currently incarcerated person filing a complaint regarding
his or her treatment must plead and prove the objective prong of
Farmer in addition to the subjective prong. Since suicide precludes
contestation of the first prong, such suits are by their nature less demanding. This is further compounded by the fact that the evidence
in suits challenging current treatment is often provided by the mistreated prisoner him or herself, thereby raising evidentiary and credibility concerns not present as extensively in suicide liability suits.
Second, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which does not apply to
suits brought by a deceased inmate’s estate, is likely to apply in full
123
force here. The PLRA acts as a deterrent to suit. It is going to limit
the representation available to the inmate, since the collection of fees
and costs is limited. Plus, the scope of relief and damages is also limited, thus further reducing the incentive for attorneys to litigate such
cases. This is in stark contrast to suits brought under Section 1983
that are not subject to the PLRA, in which there is asymmetrical fee
shifting that favors plaintiff attorneys. As a result, suits challenging
isolation and restraints as methods of preventing suicide are less likely to proceed than suits challenging inadequate precautions after an
inmate suicide.
Ultimately, suicides are expensive for prison officials. Officials
cannot contest the objective prong of the Farmer test; officials can expect a relatively substantial award of damages for death; there is no
fee-capping statute for the plaintiff’s lawyers; and a jury is likely to be
sympathetic to the deceased. By contrast, suits challenging excessive
precautions such as restraints and isolation are subject to PLRA fee
caps, PLRA limitations on physical damages, and limitations on
123

See supra Part III.
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proof, and will likely experience juries unsympathetic to the plight of
a restrained or isolated prisoner. This uneven playing field makes it
more difficult to strike a balance through tort law since the risks, and
the magnitude of the risks, do not incentivize finding a middle
ground.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND RESOLUTIONS
Tort law, including constitutional tort law, is critical to the proper
functioning of our society. It incentivizes individuals and entities to
internalize externalities and act in a manner that addresses the rights
of others. Tort law also deters individuals and entities from acting in
ways that create liability, thus deterring behavior society finds to be
offensive or repulsive. The goals of tort law are only realized when
the risk and magnitude of liability are representative of the behavior
society wishes to deter or incentivize and to the extent society intends
124
125
to do so. But here, tort law has failed.
The consequences of the imperfections in our tort law are apparent. The cost of defending against suits asserting a failure to take adequate precautions to prevent inmate suicide and the likelihood and
magnitude of liability have led prison officials to ignore the science
and, instead, employ archaic precautions. Although liability for the
inhumane conditions of confinement and a failure to provide medical care for serious mental conditions theoretically should be able to
provide a backstop to such measures, they are not doing so successfully at this point in time. In order to see the proper balance being
achieved, we need an even playing field.
The state of our current law suggests that inmate suicide should
be prevented at any cost. In addition to the perverse incentives this
creates in the treatment of suicidal prisoners, it also has implications
on one’s right to the control of one’s own body. While the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to establish a broad sweeping “right to die,”
126
there is no legal prohibition on suicide. In fact, we as a society sen124
125

126

See Keating, supra note 15, at 684–86 (discussing various level of risk reduction).
Reasonable minds differ in regards to cost-justification and constitutional torts. For an
argument that Eighth Amendment claims should not be defeated by notions of cost, see
Elizabeth Alexander, Prison Health Care, Political Choice, and the Accidental Death Penalty, 11
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1 (2008). Ms. Alexander addresses traditional notions of cost, rather
than the type of cost presented here—namely, the cost to the health and welfare of the
prisoner imposed by the use of isolation and restraints. The costs at issue here are arguably more understandable and less controversial than the fiscal considerations most oppose.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (denying constitutional due process
right to assisted suicide for not constituting a fundamental liberty interest).
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tence convicted felons in our prisons to death and force their lives to
127
In light of this, it seems contradictory to so rigorously
be taken.
prohibit determined prisoners from taking the identical action themselves.
Several courts have addressed cases where prisoners sentenced to
128
death refuse to appeal or contest their impending execution. These courts have held that a failure to contest execution indicates that
the inmate is not competent to be executed—we are fully prepared to
execute prisoners only up until the point that they consent to the execution and then the punishment is prohibited. But it seems quite
absurd to maintain that suicidal tendencies by a convicted prisoner
preparing to face his own execution are indicia of incompetence.
I make no suggestion that suicide ought to be permitted in our
prison system. I raise the aforementioned arguments in an attempt
to suggest that even though tort balancing will likely see instances of
suicide that would otherwise be prevented through extreme isolation
and restraint, it is still preferable to the inhumane suicide prevention
129
measures currently in effect.
The critical question that remains is how the outcome of suits alleging suicide liability and unconstitutional treatment can properly
reflect the type of precautions that are truly cost-justified. The most
organic way for such a change to occur is through the use of Section
1983 suits themselves. Suits alleging unconstitutional conditions of
confinement for the use of solitary confinement and those for deprivation of medical care for serious medical needs can be brought by
prisoners who are severely restrained without mental health care.
Imposing liability for actions that cross the line from treating to mistreating suicidal prisoners will incentivize officials to step back from
extreme measures in order to avoid such liability. The difficulties inherent in these suits as addressed in Part III, however, make this organic resolution largely aspirational.
Since Section 1983 suits brought by currently incarcerated persons are so difficult to mount, there may be a need for external intervention. There are two potential options for striking a balance that
are particularly viable: one requiring a long-sought decision by the
127

128

129

See, e.g., Miller ex rel. Jones v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248, 1250 (9th Cir. 2000) (granting a motion to stay execution pending competency after a death row inmate became “a volunteer”).
See generally Kristen M. Dama, Redefining A Final Act: The Fourteenth Amendment and States’
Obligation to Prevent Death Row Inmates from Volunteering to Be Put to Death, 9 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 1083 (2007).
While such a proposition admittedly seems to undermine the value of human life, it is the
same sacrifice we see pervasive in all areas of tort law free of strict liability.
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Supreme Court and the other involving the administrative capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Prisons as a subset of the Department of
Justice.
First, the Supreme Court could grant certiorari to correct the mis130
application of Section 1983 liability for prisoner suicide. The current Eighth Amendment standards of liability are entirely set by Supreme Court precedent. The Court has not specifically considered
131
the Eighth Amendment in the context of suicidal prisoners, despite
132
the strong urging of many parties and the inordinately high suicide
133
The Supreme Court has established
rate in our prisons and jails.
134
deliberate indifference as the standard for liability and has interpreted that standard to mean that the official was subjectively aware
of the risk of serious harm, yet failed to take proper precautions to
135
The application of the deliberate indifference
protect against it.
standard to the treatment of suicidal prisoners, however, remains an
136
open question. The Court has recognized that depriving a physically ill prisoner of lifesaving treatment is sufficient to at least plead a
137
But this has not been uniformly
claim of deliberate indifference.
expanded to encompass lifesaving mental health treatment for psychologically ill prisoners.
As a result, rather than providing treatment for mentally ill prisoners, officials are instituting severe practices of restraint and isola-

130
131

132

133
134
135
136

137

In this context, I define “misapplication” as the heightened level of liability imposed in
suicide cases and the lower levels of liability in restraint and isolation cases.
Reply Brief of Petitioner for Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Troyanos v. Coats, 132 S.
Ct. 1560 (2012) (No. 11-742), 2012 WL 259400, at *1 (urging the Court to grant certiorari because a Section 1983 suicide case has never been considered despite the high number of suicide cases in the circuits).
See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Appendix Volume I, Arocho v. Cnty. of
Lehigh, 555 U.S. 815 (2008) (No. 07-1361), 2008 WL 1892739; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bradley v. Simpson, 547 U.S. 1018 (2005) (No. 05-754), 2005 WL 3392967; Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Smith v. Blue, 537 U.S. 1003 (2002) (No. 02-385), 2002 WL
32134417; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, McCrary v. Comstock, 537 U.S. 817 (2002) (No.
01-1698), 2002 WL 32134047.
NOONAN & GINDER, supra note 2, at Tables 2, 15.
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S 825, 842 (1994) (“[I]t is enough that the official acted or
failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”).
Reply Brief of Petitioner for Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 131, at *1 (urging
the Court to grant certiorari because a Section 1983 suicide case has never been considered despite the high number of suicide cases in the circuits).
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007) (per curiam) (finding “[it] was error for
the Court of Appeals to conclude that the allegations in question, concerning harm
caused petitioner by the termination of his medication, were too conclusory” when the
prisoner was removed from a hepatitis C treatment program).
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tion.138 Whether such behavior—depriving the mentally ill of mental
health treatment—qualifies as deliberate indifference is an application of the Farmer standard the Court has not considered. The Court
need not decide whether prisoners are entitled to mental health care
in order to ensure balance in the implementation of suicide precautions. The Court could either grant certiorari where the lower court
decided whether an official was liable for the suicide of a prisoner or
the Court could grant certiorari where the lower court decided
whether an official was liable for excessively restraining a suicidal
prisoner without providing mental health care. The former would
provide the Court an opportunity to make clear that imposing liability for suicide requires that the official fail to take proper precautions,
not that the prison official fail to take all physically possible precautions. The latter would afford the Court an opportunity to limit the
extent to which the use of restraints can be constitutional. It is impractical to expect, and would be even more impractical to issue, a
perfectly clear opinion balancing those precautions which must be
taken to prevent suicide and those precautions that are cruel and
unusual. But simply recognizing that some balance between the two is
necessary would be an excellent first step toward recalibrating suicide
prevention policies to provide protection and treatment rather than
solely restraint and isolation.
Second, the Bureau of Prisons as an administrative agency could
promulgate regulations to govern the standards of treatment for suicidal prisoners in federal prisons. While such a regulation would not
be binding on state prisons and local jails, tort law often relies on industry standards. By providing a well-balanced policy for federal
prisons, the Bureau of Prisons could set an industry standard for all
to follow. In a similar vein, the National Commission on Correctional
139
Health Care (NCCHC) and the American Correctional Association
(ACA) could update their standards to reflect modern understand140
ings of mental illness and suicide. While NCCHC and ACA stand138

139
140

See e.g., Arocho v. Cnty. of Lehigh, 922 A.2d 1010, 1011–14 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007), cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 815 (2008) (explaining each level of suicide precaution, none of which
provide treatment for the suicidal prisoner despite requiring “medical restraints”).
Since the ACA standards are applied solely to jails, either both entities would need to
promulgate similar standards or only the NCCHC.
These standards currently require suicide prevention policies to provide for special housing, increased observation, and medical restraint. The standards do not indicate to what
extent restraints are appropriate and there is no recognition that, at a certain point, such
restraints may be more harmful than helpful. Furthermore, the standards do not provide
any type of mental health or other medical services for those classified as suicidal. AM.
CORR. ASS’N, CORE JAIL STANDARDS (2010), available at http://www.aca.org/ACA_PROD_
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ards are not binding and likewise cannot absolve officials of liability,
these standards provide easy-to-adopt guidelines that prisons and jails
can use to reform current policies.
Unlike a Supreme Court decision, which would likely create a
generally applicable rule for deliberate indifference in cases involving
suicidal prisoners, standard-setting entities could be more careful in
constructing suicide prevention measures. In this respect, specific
standards may have more of an effect on the extent and utility of reforming suicide precautions. Furthermore, the comparative ease
with which such precautions can be amended as we develop a better
understanding of mental illness and the treatment it requires is appealing. Ultimately, without a decision from the Supreme Court or
an Act of Congress, these standards will not be binding on correctional institutions or its officials. The standards will, however, set an
industry standard by which the conduct of officials and institutions
can be evaluated. As a result, either a Supreme Court decision or an
adept industry standard could have a great impact on finally striking
the balance between treating and mistreating suicidal prisoners.
CONCLUSION
The pervasiveness of mental illness and the rates of suicide in our
prison system are staggering. But the treatment of these mentally ill
and suicidal prisoners is even more alarming. Physically restraining
prisoners in painful positions for extended periods of time is effective
in physically preventing suicide and therefore Eighth Amendment suicide liability. The Eighth Amendment, however, also prohibits cruel
and unusual punishment. As a result, there must be a balance between the duty prison officials have to protect inmates from committing suicide and the extent to which officials can employ any method
possible to prevent potential suicides.
Tort law itself is intended to incentivize taking those precautions
that are cost-justified. The use of uncomfortable restraints for prolonged periods of time has its costs. It costs suicidal and mentally ill
prisoners more of their mental health and welfare. It imposes costs
that are not always justified by the results, in contravention of the
guiding principle to tort liability. While protecting prisoners from
suicide is an important task, protecting prisoners from painful and
stressful restraints is also vital.
IMIS/Docs/Standards%20and%20Accreditation/CoreJailStandards.pdf; NAT’L COMM’N
ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, STANDARDS FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN ADULT CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES (2008).
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The unique success suicide liability suits have experienced has
created an imbalance in the level of incentive provided by the risk of
Section 1983 liability. But by deterring the unjustified use of suicide
prevention measures such as solitary confinement and severe restraints through Section 1983 liability, the Eighth Amendment can
regain its balance.

